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Abstract 
 
In this paper we point out that the theoretical predictions concerning Employment Protection Leg-
islation (EPL) are not fully confirmed by empirical evidence in Italy, a strict EPL country in the nine-
ties, according to OECD indexes. In particular, worker and job flow rates are remarkably high, also in 
comparison with the other European countries. Furthermore, the differences in regional worker flow 
rates -computed on both the social security database and the LFS- are relevant, no matter which 
measure of worker flows is considered. While EPL is the same across regions, the highest worker flow 
rates are observed in the South, an area generally recognised as the least dynamic of the country, fol-
lowed by the Northeast, the Centre and the Northwest. For possible alternative explanations of re-
gional differences investigation focuses on economic structural composition, the black labour market, 
non-standard contracts, the public sector and self-employment incidence, labour productivity and firm 
seniority. Using Logit estimates we find that none of these factors can fully explain these differences. 
Moreover, the predicted negative relation between worker flows and unemployment duration does not 
seem to hold in the case of Italy. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the beginning of the nineties a growing literature has been produced on the rela-
tion between Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) and different indicators of labour 
market performance. In particular, this literature1 has come to the following two –widely 
shared - conclusions: 1) the higher the degree of EPL (according to the OECD index,2 for 
instance), the lower the level of flows in the labour market; 2) the higher the degree of 
EPL, the longer the unemployment duration.3 
Of the studies dealing with the relation between EPL and both worker and job flows, 
we dedicate particular attention to Blanchard-Portugal (2001), who provide an empirical 
test of points 1) and 2), comparing various characteristics of the US and Portuguese labour 
markets. According to the OECD indexes, Portugal displays the highest degree of EPL, 
the US the lowest. Analyzing flow rates and applying a peculiar weighting procedure, 
Blanchard-Portugal argue that EPL in Portugal is the main cause of both the low level of 
flows and the long unemployment duration. 
In the literature on this issue, the relation between EPL and labour flows is empirically 
investigated with cross section analysis, showing that where EPL index is high flow rates 
are low and unemployment duration high.4  
                                                 
* We are very grateful to Mario Amendola, Sergio Bruno, Eve Caroli, Piero Casadio, Pierre Cahuc, Andrew Clark, 
Carlo De Gregorio, Marinella Giovine, Roberto Leombruni, Silvia Loriga, Paolo Piacentini, Thomas Piketty, Fabian 
Postel Vinay, Giorgio Rodano, Herni Sneessens, Bruno Van der Linden, and three anonymous referees for their 
valuable suggestions. We are also grateful to all participants to the seminars at AIEL (Italian Association of Labour 
Economists), London School of Economics (EDP Jamboree), DELTA-CEPREMAP (Paris), Univ. Catholique de Lou-
vain, EALE conference 2003, Università di Roma “La Sapienza”, Università “Carlo Bo” di Urbino, ISFOL. We are 
also grateful to the research partnership between ISFOL and Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (La Sapienza) for 
having funded this research project. Usual disclaimer applies. 
1 See for instance Blanchard-Portugal (2001), Bentolila-Bertola (1990), Pissarides (2000), Cahuc-Zylberberg (2004), 
OECD (1999, 2004).  
2 The EPL degree is a measure of strictness of labour market legislation according to an aggregate index. Basically, 
the OECD index is built weighting three main components: legislation concerning regular employment (more in 
details governmental authorizations to fire, notices of dismissal, severance payments, unfair dismissals), legislation 
concerning temporary employment, and legislation regarding collective dismissal. See OECD (1999, 2004). 
3 Actually, OECD (2004) claims that various effects on the employment rates of some specific groups emerge from 
empirical analyses. More specifically, prime age workers seem to benefit from strict EPL while for the young and 
women this impact is negative. Further, some recent papers have set out to investigate the impact of EPL, and more 
in general of labour market institutions, on other relevant employment variables such as activity rates, employ-
ment rates and gender differences. See for instance Bertola-Blau-Kahn (2002). In this paper we do not further inves-
tigate this issue. 
4 Of course this way of proceeding does not investigate causality between variables, i.e. it is only possible to ob-
serve correlation between them (EPL and flows). This weakness is shared with the empirical cross section literature 
concerning this issue. An additional weakness of this literature is that international comparisons are usually car-
ried out without taking into account the fact that legislations and institutions are not the same across different 
countries. In our paper we can in fact assume that institutions and legislations do not change across the Italian re-
gions. 
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In this paper we investigate this issue within a single country, taking into account the 
fact that legislations and institutions are the same. If EPL were binding, in the sense that it 
played an important role in the hiring and firing processes, we would expect an almost 
uniform impact on labour market performance in different regions. In Italy we would be 
expecting low mobility and high unemployment duration, given the strict EPL. Actually, 
in 2004 the OECD index of EPL placed Italy in an intermediate position, while in 1999 it 
came second to last, just above Portugal. This is mainly due to the reforms introduced in 
Italy after 1999, concerning temporary employment. Furthermore, certain changes also af-
fected a deferred wage scheme (Trattamento di fine rapporto –TFR), paid by the employer 
to the employee after any separation (no matter the reason for the separation). Until 1999 
this scheme was ranked as severance payment policy, while the OECD subsequently de-
cided not to consider it as firing costs since it is paid for any kind of separation.5 How-
ever, this change did not significantly affect OECD ranking in the nineties – our period of 
analysis – when Italy was considered one of the strictest countries for EPL. 
Anticipating our results, we find out that Italian job and worker flow rates are re-
markably high, also in comparison with the other European countries. Furthermore, even 
though EPL is the same across the Italian regions, worker flows are significantly different 
from one region to another. More specifically, the highest are in the South, followed by 
the Northeast, the Centre and the Northwest. In our analysis the adjustment procedure à 
la Blanchard-Portugal does not produce the expected results: the standard explanation 
that Southern worker flows are higher solely because of firm size and sectoral composi-
tion differences is not empirically verified. 
The black labour market, non-standard contracts, public sector incidence, firm senior-
ity, self-employment incidence, and labour productivity are investigated as possible al-
ternative explanations of regional differences. Using logit estimates we point out that 
none of these factors seems to fully explain such differences. Another interesting result we 
derive concerns the prevalence of a positive relation, at the regional level, between unem-
ployment duration and worker flow level: where worker flows are high (low) unem-
ployment duration is high (low). This finding is not fully consistent with standard theo-
retical predictions.  
For our computations we use the INPS panel data of employees in the private sector, 
elaborated by ISFOL. Moreover, in order to test some additional hypotheses we also use 
                                                 
5 Note also that Garibaldi-Pacelli (2004) point out that the TFR entails actually similar effects to standard severance 
payment policies, increasing individual job duration. 
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the Italian Labour Force Survey, and more specifically a panel version elaborated by IS-
FOL. 
With respect to the Italian literature on these issues, well summarized in the recent 
contribution by Contini-Trivellato (2006), we add some original elements in explaining 
the regional differences of turnover and reallocation rates (black labour market, non-
standard contracts, public sector and self-employment incidences, labour productivity 
and firm seniority). Since our databases account mainly for the supply side of the labour 
market –considering only firm size and sectoral composition for the demand side-, we 
cannot devote much attention to other demand side factors (technological change, prod-
uct market characteristics, firm investment policies, training, etc), or to additional institu-
tional issues (union impact, efficiency of public employment services and regulations, leg-
islation enforcement, etc). Although these issues are relevant, they are beyond the scope 
of this paper, and will be the object of future research.  
The structure of the paper is the following. In section 2 we briefly present the empirical 
evidence in terms of international comparisons of job and worker flow rates. In section 3 
we define the worker flow definitions we use in our computations and we explain the 
characteristics of our databases. Moreover, Italian worker flow rates are computed and 
investigated, and the weighting procedure concerning regional differences is presented. 
Section 4 concerns some possible explanations of the regional differences in flow rates and 
the relation between flows and unemployment duration. Section 5 attempts to derive 
some conclusions from the findings of the paper.  
2. Worker and job flows: an international comparison 
A stricter EPL is supposed to determine two clear and direct effects on labour market 
structure: it increases unemployment duration and decreases job and worker flows. Be-
sides, the final effect on the unemployment rate is ambiguous.6 An initial step in order to 
investigate this issue empirically is to analyze the different mobility rates in different 
countries. However, it is important to stress that there are serious problems in making 
comparison, mainly because of idiosyncratic differences in both data the collection meth-
ods and the databases utilized, which may affect the official statistics.7 To cope with this 
                                                 
6 See for example OECD (1999, 2004), Pissarides (2000), Blanchard -Portugal (2001), Cahuc-Zylberberg (2004). 
7 More specifically, significant differences could be due to the nature of the reporting agency (government vs. pri-
vate institutions), the unit of measurement (plant vs. firm), the coverage of the sample (with or without public em-
ployees, with or without the smallest firms, etc.), the definition of employment (all workers, only full-time workers, 
etc.), the frequency of measurement, the differences in labour market structure (firm size, sectoral composition). 
See for instance OECD (1994), Boeri (1996). 
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situation we consider some recent papers that use homogeneous databases for European 
countries in terms of both job and worker flows.  
As far as job flows are concerned, Gomez-Salvador et al (2004) make use of the Amedeus 
database produced by Bureau van Dijk, containing comparable data at the firm level for 
European countries (and not at the establishment level) and covering all sectors except for 
the financial one. Amedeus covers firms that meet three basic criteria – they must have: an 
operating revenue greater or equal to 1 million euro; total assets greater or equal to 2 mil-
lion euro; at least 10 employees (although for the UK, Germany, France and Italy these 
thresholds become 1.5 for revenues, 3 for assets and 15 for employees). This means that 
Amedeus underestimates the share of small firms.  
Moreover, Amedeus does not allow for distinction between newly created firms and 
firms entering the sample in a given year. Similarly, no distinction is made between firms’ 
closing down and firms exiting from the sample for other reasons; thus Gomez-Salvador 
et al (2004) take only continuous firms into account.  
Using this database Gomez-Salvador et al (2004) compute the standard job flow meas-
ures, i.e. the job creation, job destruction and job reallocation rates (the latter being the 
sum of the former two), for the period 1995-2000.8 As we see in table 1, Italy displays the 
highest rate of job reallocation in Europe (12.3), despite the fact that in the nineties Italy 
was characterized by a very strict level of EPL. In this framework, it could be argued that 
the Italian rates were due to the fact that a strict EPL implies segmentation in the labour 
market, increasing the incidence of fixed term contracts (OECD, 2004). This explanation 
might apply to the high Spanish reallocation rates, since the incidence of temporary em-
ployment at the end of the nineties exceeded 30% in Spain, while it does not hold for Italy, 
where temporary employment incidence stood at about 6%.  
Furthermore, since Amedeus undervalues the share of small firms, whose incidence in 
Italy is considerably higher than in other European countries, the Italian reallocation rates 
might also be underestimated since small firms are characterized by relatively high mobil-
ity. 
(TABLE 1 HERE) 
It might also be argued that the Italian rates could be accounted for by differences in 
sectoral composition, firm seniority (since newly created firms usually display higher 
mobility) and size, or cyclical factors. This is not the case. In the last two columns of table 
1 we show the country dummies computed by Gomez-Salvador et al (2004) in an OLS es-
                                                 
8 For the definitions of these flow measures see Gomez-Salvador et al (2004) or Davis-Haltiwanger-Schuh (1996). 
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timate, using as dependent variable the job reallocation rates (at the firm level) and con-
trolling for the above-mentioned covariates (firm size and seniority, sector, and year 
dummies as proxy for cyclical fluctuations). The omitted country is the United Kingdom 
(UK). Even in this framework the Italian dummy is the highest (0.96) and is statistically 
significant – higher, for instance, than the dummies for the UK, Ireland and the Nether-
lands, countries characterized by a much lower degree of EPL strictness in the nineties.9  
Turning our attention to the worker flows, we must consider a database that allows for 
comparisons among countries. Kruppe (2001) carries out an assessment of the European 
labour market dynamics using both the European Labour Force Survey (ELFS) and the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP). Kruppe computes several mobility 
rates, in particular inflows and outflows from employment in the period 1994-1995, for 
which both surveys are available. He considers the difference in occupational status be-
tween two periods, computing a sort of reallocation rate. In the first column of table 2 it 
can be seen that, using the ELFS, the Italian rates come second highest in the European 
union, after the Spanish rates (which is partially explained by the very high incidence of 
fixed contracts). Going on to the ECHP database, the results do not change much: the Ital-
ian rates are still among the highest.10  
To sum up, for both worker and job flows the theoretical predictions are not fully con-
firmed by the empirical evidence in the case of Italy, in the sense that the Italian flow rates 
are remarkably high although Italy is a strict EPL country.11 
                                                 
9 It is also worth noting that in the second part of their paper Gomez-Salvador et al (2004) investigate the impact of 
labour market institutions on labour market flows, pointing out that EPL entails a negative effect on labour dynam-
ics. However, they argue (in a note) that these institutional results are more robust when Italy is dropped from 
analysis, meaning that the Italian labour market has to be considered as an outlier, in some way not consistent with 
standard theoretical predictions. 
10 These results on workers flows are consistent with other international comparisons, for instance Leombruni-
Quaranta (2002). 
11 Two possible explanations might be sketched out in order to explain why countries with high EPL could display 
high mobility. The first explanation stresses the idea that the relation between firing restrictions and labour market 
flows is correctly predicted by the theory and hence, ceteris paribus, EPL should lead to lower levels of flows. 
However, the data might not suffice to test this theoretical result because other institutional differences may de-
termine opposite effects on flows. According to this interpretation, Bertola-Rogerson (1997) detect wage compres-
sion as another institution able to offset the effect of EPL on job and worker flows. Bertola-Rogerson claim that 
when wage compression policies and EPL are implemented simultaneously the effects on job and worker turnover 
are ambiguous, since EPL tends to reduce flows while wage compression tends to increase them (firms cannot ad-
just wages and for this reason have to resort to quantity -employment- adjustments). Note that it is not possible to 
test the Bertola-Rogerson hypothesis using our data since we cannot distinguish between quits and layoffs. The 
second approach is the one proposed by Blanchard-Wolfers (2000). They try to combine the role of shocks and in-
stitutions in the rise of European unemployment, starting from the observation that neither the institutions alone 
nor shocks alone have been able to explain the appreciable differences between European countries. However, 
Blanchard-Wolfers do not directly analyze the dynamics of the labour market, focusing their attention only on the 
unemployment rate dynamics. So far, neither of the two approaches can provide a satisfactory explanation -and 
empirical verification- of the high dynamics in the Italian labour market. 
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(TABLE 2 HERE) 
3. The Italian Case: worker flow rates definitions and database explanations. 
In this section we briefly present evidence concerning Italian labour market mobility, 
focusing our attention on worker turnover and reallocation.  
To begin with, let us explain more fully the kind of flow rate definitions we use in this 
paper.12 It is useful to bear in mind that job flows refer to job creation and destruction 
measured at firm level (e.g. having at disposal information at the firm level), while 
worker flows indicate job transitions measured at the worker level (generally computed 
on either administrative and social security data or LFS). In the following pages of the pa-
per we focus on two basic standard measures of worker flows: Gross Worker Reallocation 
and Gross worker Turnover. 
We define Gross worker reallocation at time t (Gwr) as the number of persons whose place 
of employment or employment status differs between t-1 and t. Moreover, we refer to the 
Gross worker turnover at time t (Gwt) as the number of accessions plus the number of sepa-
rations that occur during the interval from t-1 to t.13  
A basic and important difference between Gwt and Gwr is that Gwr compares two 
situations between two moments in time (t and t-1), without taking into account what 
happens during the interval. On the other hand, Gwt measures all the transitions that take 
place during the interval of time between t and t-1. In other words, while Gwt measures 
the number of worker transitions, Gwr measures the number of workers that participate 
in the transition. For these reasons, the difference between Gwt and Gwr can provide a 
measure of how dynamic mobile workers are.14  
Following the previous definitions, Gwt and Gwr rates are computed by dividing Gwt 
and Gwr by the average employment (expressed in job positions).  
For our computations we use an administrative employer-employee database, pro-
vided by INPS (the Italian social security institute), working on a panel version of this da-
tabase, elaborated by ISFOL. The sample units are full-time employees15 in all the private 
                                                 
12 For a deeper examination of the relevance of job and worker flow rates see for instance Blanchard-Diamond 
(1990), Davis-Haltiwanger (1995), Davis-Haltiwanger-Schuh (1996), Anderson - Meyer (1994), and, for Italy, Con-
tini (2002), Contini-Trivellato (2006).  
13 Gwt and Gwr definitions are derived from Davis-Haltiwanger (1995). 
14 In the Northwest this difference is the lowest, meaning that the additional mobility of workers changing em-
ployment status or place of employment is not very relevant. On the contrary, regions like the Northeast and the 
South are characterized by a greater difference between Gwt and Gwr, meaning that the additional mobility of 
workers engaged in Gwr is substantial. Moreover, by construction, Gwt ≥ Gwr. 
15 Apprenticeships and part-time workers are excluded from our database. This should not alter the mobility rate 
estimates, as during the ‘80s and early ‘90s the respective shares of Italian employment were about 5%. 
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sectors but agriculture. The panel is constructed by merging INPS employee information 
database with the employer information database and covers 14 years, from 1985 to 
1999.16  
Using this database we can deal with these mobility issues effectively, because for each 
worker we have the monthly information about mobility. In other words, we can compute 
not only the mobility taking place between two consecutive years but also what happens 
during this interval of time.17 
Moreover, in order to test additional hypotheses we also use the Italian Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) supplied by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). More specifi-
cally, we used a Panel version of the Labour Force Survey, elaborated by ISFOL,18 in 
which we can follow each individual for two consecutive waves. 
3.1. National and Regional Worker Turnover and Worker Reallocation in Italy 
In this section we investigate the main characteristics of Italian labour market dynam-
ics. Table 3 displays the average Italian rates from 1985 to 1999 for Gwt, Gwr, accession 
and separation, using the INPS panel. In figure 1 it is possible to observe that, broadly 
speaking, turnover and reallocation rates grow until 1990, then decrease until 1993, after 
which they start to grow again. This trend confirms the pro-cyclical pattern of these flow 
rates for European countries. 
(FIG. 1 HERE) 
Moreover, it is worth noting that all the curves display similar trends. In particular, the 
accession and separation rates (the two components of worker turnover) do not display 
significant differences, although the accession rates seem to be more sensitive to the busi-
ness cycle than the separation rates.19  
(TAB. 3 HERE) 
The total turnover and reallocation rates are, as expected, higher in small firms, while 
they diminish in very large plants. As Table 4 shows, the Gwt rates in 1-to-5 employee 
firms are five times higher than the over-500 employee firms. 
                                                 
16 The sample scheme is designed to draw individuals born on the 10th of March, June, September and December 
of each year, and therefore the proportion of our sample out of the Italian population of employees is approxi-
mately 1/90. 
17 Moreover, the results of this paper are, where comparable, consistent with previous analysis carried out on the 
same INPS database. In particular, Contini (2002) provided an in-depth analysis of the worker turnover evolution 
in Italy from various points of view, distinguishing flows for both employee and employer characteristics. See 
Leombuni-Quaranta (2002) for the methodology of flows computation.  
18 See Centra-Discenza-Rustichelli (2001). 
19 These results confirm standard predictions on this issue; see for instance Blanchard-Diamond (1990). Besides, 
figure 1 shows a clear incremental effect due to fixed term contracts and temporary work contracts on flows, from 
1998 on, as labour market legislation on this issue changed significantly (the so-called “Pacchetto Treu”). 
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The Gwt and Gwr rates in different regions of Italy are set out in table 4, where the fig-
ures are computed as 14-year averages. The South, which is supposed to be a low per-
forming region, displays the highest rates for all worker flow measures. The Northeast, 
which is in fact considered the most dynamic region, is the second most mobile region, 
followed by the Centre and the Northwest, the latter being the least mobile. 
(TAB. 4 HERE) 
It is worth noting that the remarkable regional differences cannot be explained by dif-
ferences in EPL or by differences in the institutions, which are basically the same across 
Italian regions. EPL is not always exactly the same because some details may change ac-
cording to the specific region concerned, for the basic idea behind the labour market legis-
lation is the same at the national level, but some operational details may change at the re-
gional level. 
When regional differences occur in the legislation, EPL is always stricter in the South 
than in the other regions, in order to reinforce protection against the higher risk of being 
unemployed (and/or long-term unemployed)20. Furthermore, an important point to stress 
is that Ichino et al (2003) showed that the degree EPL of enforcement depends on local la-
bour market conditions. More specifically, they point out that in Italy the higher the un-
employment rate, the more effective is the EPL enforcement, entailing higher firing costs 
in the South than in the other regions (due to court costs). This means that effective EPL 
should be stricter in the South, in turn implying lower flow rates. 
In this legislative and enforcement framework -and according to economic theory pre-
dictions- we would expect lower flow rates and higher unemployment duration in the 
South. Our preliminary findings indicate that in Italy the empirical evidence runs quite 
counter to what would be predicted by standard economic theory. 
 
3.2. Hypotheses and testing for weighting schemes.  
On the basis of the figures given in the previous sections we can draw some prelimi-
nary conclusions. First of all, Gwt and Gwr rates differ significantly at the regional level. 
What are the factors that can explain these differences?  
                                                 
20 Two typical examples of the stricter EPL in the South are, for instance, the ‘Cassa integrazione guadagni’ and the 
‘mobilità lunga’, which are more generous in the South, even if the basic idea of the legislation is the same at the 
national level. Note that these two policies entail different impacts on Gwr computation, since a worker engaged in 
‘mobilità’ moves from employment to unemployment while a worker engaged in ‘cassa integrazione’ remains offi-
cially employed. It is also important to stress that in the last decade a large-scale decentralization process in labour 
market policies took place in Italy (after our investigation period). For a survey of these issues see Pirrone-Sestito 
(2006). 
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One intuitive explanation concerns the distribution of firm size in different areas, since 
the empirical literature on this point clearly shows that flow rates are inversely related to 
firm size.21 The Intermediate Census of Industry and Services (ISTAT) reveals that in 
Southern Italy the share of employment in small firms is higher than in the rest of Italy: 
more than 44% of workers are employed in under-15 employee firms, while in the North-
west, for instance, the corresponding share is about 27.5%. This evidence suggests that 
overall rates should be affected by regional economic structures: the higher the shares of 
employment in small firms, the higher will be the flows rates.  
Sectors of activity seem equally important when determinants of mobility are investi-
gated. Contini (2002) points out that construction, trading and social and private services 
are characterized by higher Gwt and Gwr rates than the other sectors. On the other hand, 
finance intermediation and heavy industries workers are less mobile.  
The effects of firm size and sectoral composition can be jointly taken into account ap-
plying a weighting procedure -à la Blanchard-Portugal (2001)- to rate computation.   
Formally, the adjusted flows can be expressed by the formula: 
∑=
kj
R
kj
a
kj
a fGwtGwt
,
,, , 
Where a is a geographical area, j represents the size class, k represents the sector and 
R
kjf ,  are the employment shares in the reference structure. 
We can divide the weighting procedure into two components, turnover (Gwtjk) and the 
structural aspect (fjkr). The former tells us how mobile the workers are in every cell in each 
country or region (for firm size and sectoral composition), while the latter suggests how 
much every single cell has to weigh in order to end up with comparable rates among 
countries/regions. 
The set of weights we have chosen is the share of workers in private sectors for each 
firm size class and activity sector in Italy, derived both from the ‘Intermediate Census of 
Industry and Services’ of 1996 and from the panel itself. 
In table 5 we display unadjusted and adjusted rates for the period 1985-1999. The main 
results are: i) the gaps between regional flow rates decrease; ii) the adjusted Southern 
rates remain higher than the rates in other regions, no matter which kind of weighting 
system is used. 
(TAB. 5 HERE) 
                                                 
21 See for instance Davis-Haltiwanger (1995), Anderson-Meyer (1994). 
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In the light of these findings we conclude that in the Italian case the weighting proce-
dure does not produce evidence bearing out the expected theoretical predictions. The 
standard explanation that in the South worker flows are higher simply because of differ-
ences in firm size and in sectoral composition is not empirically verified. Investigating the 
components of the weighting procedure we find that the structural component is not 
strong enough to reverse fully the higher mobility observed in the South.22  
Finally, it is worth noting that, even after the weighting procedure, a wide gap remains 
between the Gwt in the North-East and in the North-West. This is an interesting finding 
since the North-East and North-West are very similar in terms of EPL enforcement and in 
terms of social-economic factors other than firm size and sectoral composition. In a sense, 
the divergence in the Gwt rates between these regions is at least as surprising as the one 
between the North and the South. 
4. What lies behind regional differences in worker flows rates? 
In this section we investigate some other possible explanations for regional differences 
in worker flows rates: the black labour market, the incidence of non-standard contracts, 
the incidences of the public sector and self-employment, and labour productivity. 
4.1.1. Possible explanations (i): the black labour market  
The black labour market, which entails a substantial reduction in labour costs, could be 
considered as a possible candidate since it is estimated to be very widespread in the 
South. According to Baldassarini-Pascarella (2003), the share of unregistered full time 
equivalent units in the South amounts to 22.4% of all working positions, while in the Cen-
tre and the North the corresponding rate is 11%: the regional differences emerge quite 
clearly.23 
Which could be the main effects on worker flows determined by the black labour mar-
ket?24 At first sight, there are at least two different effects.  
                                                 
22 Naticchioni-Rustichelli-Scialà (2003) show –in appendix- that for every firm size class, except the last, mobility is 
higher in the South than in the other regions.  
23 According to international definitions, in particular the definitions included in SNA93 and SEC95, it is possible to 
distinguish three different types of ‘black’ labour market: illegal activities, carried out by enterprises entirely un-
registered; underground activities, carried out by registered firms that for either economic reasons or statistical 
problems decide to hide some relevant information concerning the labour market (evasion of social security contri-
butions, distortions of working time and working position procedures, etc.); informal activities, defined by legal 
firms characterized, for instance, by low levels of organization, unclear separation between capital and labour, fam-
ily based structure, etc. 
24 A recent paper that seeks to evaluate the impact of the black labour market on employment and unemployment 
variables is Boeri-Garibaldi (2002). Nevertheless they do not go into the impact of the black labour market on 
worker turnover. 
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Firstly, some of the “black” market workers in Italy frequently enter and exit from the 
legal labour market in order to be eligible for pension contributions. In particular, some of 
the ‘underground’ workers spend most of the time working in the black market but, in 
the meanwhile, have informal agreements with their employers in order to work in the 
legal market, at least the minimum amount of hours needed to be eligible for the pension 
system.25 In this way the ‘underground’ market might imply a substantial increase in the 
“legal” labour market flows. This effect can to some extent be assessed computing the job 
recall rates using INPS data: since the number of job recalls is very small and does not 
change significantly across regions, we can conclude that this effect should be negligible. 
Secondly, the black labour market could imply a higher reservation wage for workers. 
In a standard theoretical model (e.g. Mortensen-Pissarides, 1994) a higher reservation 
wage in the South would imply a higher share of quits, because the outside option for the 
worker is greater than in other regions. In this framework it would entail a higher job 
turnover.26  
Both effects we have considered would imply a positive impact of the black labour 
market on labour turnover. This would also mean that the regional differences are a spu-
rious phenomenon, caused mainly by the different incidence of the black labour market. 
In section 4.2 we will attempt to verify this hypothesis, using the Italian Labour Force 
Survey (ISTAT). Anticipating our results, we can state that it does not seem to be the case. 
Actually, the relation between the black labour market and turnover is not significant.  
 
4.1.2. Possible explanations (ii): the different impact of non-standard contracts 
A second candidate to explain the different Gwt rates between the Italian regions might 
be the uneven incidence of fixed term contracts. Actually, in the South they represent 42% 
of the total of fixed term contracts in Italy.27 A higher rate of fixed term contracts implies a 
higher Gwt rate due to the fact that even if a worker continues to be in the same firm at 
the end of the fixed term period, formally he/she will be laid-off and then hired again: a 
new contract will begin. On the other hand, part-time contracts are widespread in the 
Northeast (54% of the part-time contracts in Italy). Since a large share of these kinds of 
contracts are permanent, they do not imply any impact on Gwt. In other words, different 
kinds of non-standard contracts widespread in the South (fixed term contracts) and in the 
                                                 
25 It is worth noting that the same argument may hold to acquire eligibility for unemployment benefits.  
26 Note that there might be at work also some demand side determinants for the black labour market to emerge, 
such as lower fiscal costs, higher flexibility in the management of the workforce etc. 
27 Eurostat – New Cronos database available on line.  
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Northeast (part-time contracts) could determine different impacts on Gwt in the different 
regions. 
We cannot use the INPS database to test these hypotheses because fixed term contracts 
are not explicitly recognizable. Hence, we work with a panel version of the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) set up by ISFOL. For our purposes, we identify the same type of workers as 
the INPS database, i.e. subordinate workers in all private sectors but agriculture. Further, 
using the LFS we have to focus our attention on yearly Gross Worker Reallocation rates 
alone: we are not able to compute the gross worker turnover rates because we do not have 
detailed information on what happens during the period. 
(TAB. 6 HERE) 
Table 6 shows that the Gwr rates derived from LFS are quite close to those derived 
from the INPS database. Moreover, the LFS reallocation rates are even higher than the 
rates derived from the INPS database and the results are also qualitatively very similar 
(the region rank is basically the same). This represents evidence of the robustness of our 
previous findings on the INPS data. Besides, when fixed term workers are excluded, the 
Gwr are clearly lower everywhere and, quite strikingly, lower in Southern Italy. Neverthe-
less, in the latter region the Gwr rates remain clearly higher than in the Central and 
Northern regions of the country. 
4.1.3 Other possible explanations (iii): public sector, self-employed and productivity 
Other macroeconomic issues might have an impact on worker flows. The first issue we 
deal with is the different incidence of the public sector in the Italian regions, which could 
partially account for the higher turnover rates in the South. As shown in table 7, the em-
ployment share of the public sector in the South is appreciably higher than in the other 
areas. On one hand, since public employees are typically less mobile, it could imply some 
local labour market rigidity reducing mobility in the private sector. On the other hand, 
the higher incidence of public employment might increase labour market segmentation, 
thus inducing, rather, higher mobility in the private sector. 
Other possible factors that might affect mobility rates are the different incidence of self-
employment and the different patterns of labour productivity trends across the Italian 
provinces, as shown in table 7. In the following section we will discuss the role of these 
factors.  
 (TAB. 7 HERE) 
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4.2 An econometric test of our hypotheses. 
In order to test all the possible explanations we have taken into account at the same 
time, we use a simple econometric model on LFS data. More specifically, we carry out a 
logit estimate taking as a dependent variable the fact of having had a reallocation in the 
last year. Among the explicative variables we control for all the ‘standard’ variables (gen-
der, age, qualification, education) and for the additional variables we have considered in 
this paper (firm size and sector, fixed term and part time contracts, public sector inci-
dence, self-employed incidence, public sector and self-employed incidences, productivity 
trends, black labour market rates).  
In column 1 we introduce as covariates only the regional dummies (omitting the 
Northwest), which the variables we are interested in. They are significantly different from 
one another in the period 1994-1998.  
After controlling for standard covariates (gender, age, education, firm size, sector and 
year dummies), column 2 shows that the regional ranking is the same, although the dif-
ferences in magnitude are smaller. As expected, the probability of reallocation decreases 
in firm size, increases for part time workers and even more for fixed term workers, and 
decreases in worker age.  
In column 3 we go on to add all the other possible explanations discussed in the previ-
ous sections (black market, unemployment rates, atypical contracts, public sector and self-
employed incidences, productivity trends). Moving from column 2 to 3 the ranking of re-
gional dummies partially changes, meaning that the additional explanations we consid-
ered play some role. The South remains the region with the highest reallocation rates, the 
dummy for the Centre becomes significant while the North-east becomes not significant. 
This is probably due to the fact that the additional explanations are correlated to the re-
gional dummies.28  
 More specifically, we observe that the impact of atypical contracts is positive and, 
as expected, this impact is higher for fixed term contracts than for part time. Besides, the 
public sector incidence is negative, as expected, while none of the other macroeconomic 
                                                 
28 It is not easy to disentangle the different effects due to the unemployment rates, the black labour market shares 
and the regional dummies, since they are quite positively correlated with one another as well as with regional 
dummies. For this reason we have also carried out different logit estimates (not shown in this paper) introducing 
one by one the unemployment rates and black labour market shares. Basically, the results do not change. More-
over, we estimated a logit introducing activity rates that are quite different across the Italian regions. Also in this 
case the major results do not change. Note, too, that we also used other, different specifications for both regional 
black employment and unemployment rates (both quadratic and five deciles dummies). The results do not change 
much: the coefficients are either insignificant or very small, and do not change the magnitude of the regional dum-
mies. 
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factors (self-employment, productivity, unemployment rate and black labour market) are 
significant.  
(TAB. 8 HERE) 
When analysing workers flows, firm seniority is another factor to take into account, 
since younger firms display higher mobility rates than older ones. Using the INPS dataset 
we carry out two additional logit estimates. In the first we include firm seniority as ex-
planatory variable (column 2 in table 9), while in the second we limit our sample to con-
tinuous firms only. As in Gomez et al (2004) this allows to control for ‘spurious’ realloca-
tions due to either newly created firms or firm closures. 
We carry out a similar exercise – controlling for different variables - using the panel 
INPS database. In this way we can control for other additional variables that might have a 
significant impact on the probability of reallocation. Gomez et al (2004) claim that firm 
seniority has to be considered as control variable, since the empirical evidence shows that 
younger firms display higher mobility. Furthermore, considering only continuous firms, 
as in Gomez et al (2004), we can indirectly control for ‘spurious’ reallocations due to either 
newly created firms or firm closures. 
 (TABLE 9 HERE) 
In column 1 of table 9, we include as covariates only the regional dummies. The results 
are consistent with the previous findings on LFS logit. Moreover, column 2 shows -as ex-
pected- that firm seniority plays a relevant role in the probability of reallocation, reducing 
the regional gaps. Nevertheless, differences in regional dummies are still relevant and 
significant. Finally, in column 3 we have considered only continuous firms,29 in order to 
control also for the firm births and closures. Again, in this case the results do not basically 
change. 
4.3. An unclear relation between worker flows and unemployment duration 
The fact that Gwt is higher in the South raises some interesting questions. In particular, 
it is worth noting that unemployment duration is much higher in the South than in the 
North. According to Table 10, average unemployment duration (UD) in the South (32,6 
months) is more than two times higher than in the North-East (14,9 months), and well 
above the figure of the North-West (20,8). Moreover, long-term unemployment (LTU) in 
the South affects about 11.5%(60%) of the labour force (of the unemployed) while in the 
North the corresponding rate is about 2-3% (40%), below the European (EU15) average. 
                                                 
29 More specifically, we have only considered reallocations that take place at least one year after a firm’s birth and 
one year before a firm’s closure.  
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This means that in Italy we observe in all regions but the Northeast a slightly positive re-
lation between worker flows and unemployment duration. Roughly speaking, in the 
South the worker flows are high and UD is high, in the Northwest and the Centre the 
flows are low and UD is quite low. Only in the Northeast are the flows high and UD low.  
(TABLE 10 HERE) 
In the light of Blanchard-Portugal (2001) and the standard literature we were expecting 
to observe a negative relation between these two variables. In Italy we observe a negative 
relation only in the Northeast (high flows and low UD). However, quite surprisingly, this 
relation is the opposite of what one would expect in a strict EPL country, where the flows 
should be low and UD high.  
If EPL was the main institution able to have a significant impact on the labour market 
structure, we should expect a uniform impact of EPL on unemployment duration across 
the country, considering also the fact that the current institutions and legislations are the 
same in the different regions.30  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we point out that the theoretical predictions are not fully confirmed for 
Italy, a country characterized by strict EPL in the nineties. Using Panel INPS and LFS data 
we showed that: 1) worker and job flow rates are considerably high in Italy, also in com-
parison with the other European Countries; 2) worker flow rates are very different at the 
regional level, even after controlling for all variables of interest (firm size and sectoral 
composition, non-standard contracts, public sector and self-employment incidences, la-
bour productivity, black labour market and firm seniority); 3) the theoretically predicted 
negative relation between unemployment duration and flow rates in the different regions 
is not confirmed for the Italian case.  
To sum up, what can be said of EPL in Italy? Roughly speaking, Italy does not seem to 
suffer from the typical problems related to strict EPL. Does this mean that EPL does not 
affect the behaviour of workers and employers? Our findings probably fail to justify such 
an extreme conclusion.  
Nevertheless, with this paper we have attempted to provide empirical foundations for 
the political debate on EPL reform in Italy. If Italian mobility is among the highest in 
Europe and long term unemployment is not a major problem in the North and Centre, 
                                                 
30 This implies that the explanation of Bertola-Rogerson (1997) concerning wage compression cannot apply to this 
framework because the wage setting in Italy takes place mainly at the national level, and hence wage compression 
is basically the same across different regions. 
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why should such a reform be so important for the Italian labour market? Why should it be 
considered more important than other possible reforms (unemployment benefits, active 
labour market policies, etc.)? 
Certainly, the high long-term unemployment rate in the South is decidedly worrying, 
and this might have to do with EPL. However, if it depended on factors related either to 
skill deterioration or worker discouragement, there would be little point in reforming or 
modifying EPL, while it could be more appropriate, according to economic theory, to in-
troduce active labour market policies, training schemes etc. Similarly, if the high unem-
ployment duration in the South was due mainly to low growth dynamics, structural prob-
lems of the economy, lack of private and public investments and matters of technological 
change, the reform of EPL would not seem to be an appropriate tool to cope with these 
phenomena. 
Furthermore, in order to evaluate the welfare effects deriving from this kind of policy 
correctly it can not suffice to analyze the impact of EPL on labour market flows and un-
employment duration, neglecting other important ‘spillovers’ and policy coordination ef-
fects pointed out in the recent literature31. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 For instance, Nickell-Layard (1999) point out that EPL does matter, not only for unemployment issues 
but also for economic growth. Besides, Belot-Boone-van Ours (2002) sets out to evaluate the welfare ef-
fects of EPL in a theoretical framework arguing that EPL “might be desirable both from the point of 
view of the worker (job stability and wage gains) and of the firm (productivity gains)”. Similar conclu-
sions are reached by Pissarides (2001) and Ricci-Waldmann (2006). Another stream of the literature, in-
troduced by Feldstein (1976), stressed the importance of employment protection in taking into account 
the social cost of firing decisions made by employers. In order to face macroeconomic instability firms 
hire and fire workers according to their profit maximization, without taking into account the social cost 
that these firing decisions will determine (unemployment benefits for unemployed workers, training 
costs, etc.). In this framework, employment protection can be considered as a policy that forces employ-
ers both to reduce and to internalize, at least partially, the social costs due to layoffs. This interpretation 
has been further developed recently in Blanchard - Tirole (2004) and Bertola (2004), which try to design 
a sort of optimal scheme for EPL following basically two main guidelines: 1) underlying the importance 
of EPL when workers are risk averse and markets are incomplete; 2) pursuing efficiency, since firms are 
required to internalize the social cost linked to their layoff decisions. More specifically, the efficiency 
goal is achieved combining EPL and unemployment benefits: for instance employers have to pay a lay-
off tax to the agency that provides the unemployment benefits.  
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Tables and Pictures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gwr* Gwt
Accession 
rate
Separation 
rate
39.8 66.9 34.0 32.9
*1986-1998.  Source: Panel ISFOL on INPS data
Table 3: Gross worker reallocation, gross worker
turnover, accession and separation rates in Italy,
1985-1999.
 
JC JD JR
Country 
dummy
t-stat
Austria 4.6 3.4 7.9 -5.36 -20.33
Belgium 5.2 3.8 9 -2.30 -22.13
Denmark 6.2 3.3 9.5 -4.73 -17.82
Finland 7 3 9.9 -3.59 -22.21
France 5.1 3.2 8.3 -3.51 -38.56
Germany 4.4 3.7 8.1 -3.94 -15.47
Ireland 8.5 3.1 11.5 -1.67 -5.92
Italy 8.2 4.1 12.3 0.96 -5.52
Netherlands 6.5 4.3 10.8 -1.51 -11.22
Portugal 4.9 3.5 8.4 -3.12 -12.36
Spain 8.6 3.4 12.1 0.72 -3.22
Sweden 8.1 3.6 11.7 -1.00 -3.56
UK 6.6 4.4 11 - -
Euro area 5.6 3.7 9.3
Source: Gomez-Salvador et al (2004); database Amedeus  (Bureau van Dijk)
Table 1: Job Creation (JC), Job Destruction (JD) and Job Reallocation (JR)
rates, and the countries dummies derived from OLS estimate using as
dependent variable the JR rates and several controls (firm size and seniority,
sector, year dummies). UK is the reference country. 
Table 2: Inflows and Outflows from Employment
ELFS ECHP
Belgium 12.6 15.7
Denmark 22.6 18.7
Germany 16.3 16.1
Greece 18.6 29.8
Spain 29.2 32.2
France 20.2 12.3
Ireland 20.5 25.6
Italy 23.6 22.4
Luxembourg 10.8 8.9
Netherlands 18.7 22.5
Portugal 17 20.7
UK 19.7 21
Source: Kruppe (2001)
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Gwt Gwr
1985-1999 1986-1998
North-West 53.9 35.2
North-East 74.1 39.0
Central 64.1 38.3
South 84.7 50.6
Firm size
1-5 108.4 53.4
6-15 81.8 45.4
16-49 64.6 40.5
50-199 51.7 34.3
200-499 39.2 29.6
500-W 23.6 24.3
Total 66.9 39.8
Source: panel Isfol on Inps data
Table 4: Gwt and Gwr according
to regions and firm size
Region
Table 5: 1986-1998 unadjusted and adjusted Gwt according to regions
Not adjusted Census Adjusted Panel Adjusted
North-West 49,4 56,4 52,6
North-East 68,9 67,6 67,7
Central 58,4 59,3 58,3
South 79,4 71,3 72,6
Italy 61,7 62,8 61,7
Source Panel Isfol on INPS data.
 
with fixed 
terms
without 
fixed 
terms
North-West 34.5 32.5 27.0
North-East 37.8 34.2 30.8
Centre 34.5 32.2 30.2
South 40.0 36.2 38.4
Italy 36.9 33.9 30.9
North-West 34.9 32.9 28.6
North-East 36.9 33.4 33.5
Centre 37.5 35.0 34.5
South 42.3 39.3 42.7
Italy 38.0 35.3 33.8
Source: Panel Isfol on LFS survey and panel Isfol on INPS data.
1994-
1995
1995-
1996
Table 6: Gwr computed using LFS panel, with and
without fixed terms contracts.
LFS Gwr
INPS Gwr
 22
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Table 8: Logit estimates on the probability of having a reallocation, using LFS
 B P-value B P-value B P-value
North-West 0.000 0.000 0.024
North-East 0.116 0.000 0.063 0.021 0.036 0.227
Centre 0.051 0.053 -0.002 0.937 0.087 0.027
South 0.290 0.000 0.182 0.000 0.196 0.002
0.118 0.000 -0.027 0.389
15-24
25-34 -0.802 0.000 -0.760 0.000
35-49 -1.197 0.000 -1.086 0.000
50-W -0.838 0.000 -0.689 0.000
High education
Medium education -0.020 0.625 0.039 0.354
Low education 0.032 0.473 0.136 0.004
Blue collar
White collar -0.190 0.000 -0.091 0.001
Managers -0.250 0.000 -0.132 0.010
Undefined
1-5 -0.675 0.000 -0.698 0.000
6-15 -0.945 0.000 -0.949 0.000
16-49 -1.080 0.000 -1.077 0.000
50-199 -1.120 0.000 -1.113 0.000
200-W -1.300 0.000 -1.304 0.000
Public Sector Share -0.023 0.000
Labour Product. -0.001 0.663
Self-empl share 0.004 0.161
Unempl. Rate 0.005 0.106
Black labour market 0.001 0.871
Part-time 0.617 0.000
Fixed-term 1.805 0.000
Year dummies
Sector dummies
Constant -0.770 0.000 1.064 0.000 0.762 0.000
Source: panel ISFOL on LFS-ISTAT data
Only regions Std. Controls All controls
Regions
Age
Education
Profess. status
Female
Firm size
NO YES YES
NO YES YES
Atypical contr.
 
 
 
North-West 17.7 34.9 33.8 35.7
North-East 18.0 36.9 35.6 46.6
Centre 23.4 37.5 33.8 37.1
South 29.9 42.3 40.8 49.3
Italy 22.9 38.0 36.3 43.6
Source: Panel Isfol on LFS survey.
Table 7: Gross Worker Reallocation computed computed with or
without Public Sector, 1995-1996
Emplyoyment 
share of PA
LFS GWR (with fixed terms)
All private 
sectors
With PA
Workers with at least 
one member of the 
family working in PA
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Table 9: Logit estimate on the probability of having a reallocation, using INPS data
B Sig. B Sig. B Sig.
North-West
North-East 0.32 0.000 0.18 0.000 0.19 0.000
Centre 0.15 0.000 0.07 0.000 0.07 0.000
South 0.46 0.000 0.24 0.000 0.24 0.000
1 3.24 0.000 2.70 0.000
2-3 0.91 0.000 0.50 0.000
4-10 0.54 0.000 0.47 0.000
11-20 0.32 0.000 0.31 0.000
20-W - - - -
-1.02 0.000 0.74 0.000 0.77 0.000
Number of cases 415891
Firm seniority 
(in year)
Source: Panel Isfol on INPS data. Others controls (classes are the same as the previous Logit on LFS): age,
age^2, gender, qualification, sector, firm size, yearly dummies. Note that in INPS database there is no
information on fixed term contracts and education levels. Part time contracts are excluded. 
Area
Constant
418189 392429
Dependent variable: having a 
reallocation.
Only regions
All Controls and 
firm seniority
All Controls and firm 
seniority in 
continuous firms
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Trends in Gwt, Gwr, accession and separation rates in Italy, 1986-1998
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
Accession rate
Separation rate
Gwt
Gwr
Source: Panel Isfol on Inps data.
Region Gwt Gwr LTU rate Average UD
Average 
tenure
North-West 46.2 30.6 3.3 20.8 34.7
North-East 64.3 34.5 2.0 14.9 28.3
Central 54.2 34.1 4.8 24.1 31.3
South 68.8 43.5 11.3 32.6 24.2
Source: Panel Isfol on INPS data and LFS.
Table 10: Regional relation between worker flows, long term
unemployment (LTU) and unemployment duration (UD)
